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ABSTRACT
Purpose  This paper furthers the analysis of patterns regulating capi-
talist accumulation based on a historical anthropology of economic activ-
ities revolving around and within the Mauritian Export Processing Zone
(EPZ).
Design/methodology/approach  This paper uses fieldwork in Mauritius
to interrogate and critique two important concepts in contemporary social
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theory  “embeddedness” and “the informal economy.” These are viewed
in the wider frame of social anthropology’s engagement with (neoliberal)
capitalism.
Findings  A process-oriented revision of Polanyi’s work on embedded-
ness and the “double movement” is proposed to help us situate EPZs
within ongoing power struggles found throughout the history of capital-
ism. This helps us to challenge the notion of economic informality as
supplied by Hart and others.
Social implications  Scholars and policymakers have tended to see eco-
nomic informality as a force from below, able to disrupt the legal-
rational nature of capitalism as practiced from on high. Similarly, there
is a view that a precapitalist embeddedness, a “human economy,” has
many good things to offer. However, this paper shows that the practices
of the state and multinational capitalism, in EPZs and elsewhere, exactly
match the practices that are envisioned as the cure to the pitfalls of
capitalism.
Value of the paper  Setting aside the formal-informal distinction in
favor of a process-oriented analysis of embeddedness allows us better to
understand the shifting struggles among the state, capital, and labor.
Keywords: Capitalism; export processing zone; Polanyi; Mauritius
INTRODUCTION
Export processing zones (EPZs) have been central to the globalization that
has happened in light-industrial manufacturing sectors such as textiles, gar-
ments, and light consumer electronics since the end of the Second World
War. Accordingly, EPZs, and their most recent relabeling as Special
Economic Zones (SEZs), have for long been an important concern for eco-
nomic anthropologists (e.g. Nash & Ferna´ndez-Kelly, 1983; Ong, 1987).
Recently anthropologists have developed a renewed interest, identifying the
zones either as harbingers of neoliberalism in Southeast Asian economies
(Ong, 2006) or in explicit opposition to this, as mere extensions of informal
employment regimes that Indians have witnessed since the colonial era
(Cross, 2010). Elsewhere I have argued that anthropology’s analysis is best
advanced if we consider neoliberalism as one of several possible manifesta-
tions of “capitalist accumulation and their regulation by nation-states and
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international organisations” (Neveling, 2014, p. 19). This shifts our under-
standing from neoliberalism as an all-encompassing historical phenomenon
to the analysis of capitalism and its untimely coincidences and “structured
contingencies” (cf. Kalb, 2012) in patterns of regulating exploitation.
This paper takes that concern further, based on the example of the
Mauritius Export Processing Zone (MEPZ). The MEPZ was established by
the Mauritian state in 1970, only two years after independence, with the aim
of boosting economic development by attracting foreign investors. As with
all EPZs established since 1947, incentives were the paramount means to
attract foreign investors and included waivers of tax and customs payments
for a given number of years, low-cost rental or lease of state-built industrial
infrastructure, and the promise of a cheap workforce without the right
of unionization (Neveling, 2015a). Reference to the “nimble fingers” of
Mauritian women should further arouse investors’ imaginations of highly
productive young Third-World women workers. This is a common trope in
EPZs across the globe, and anthropologists have long pointed to the “orien-
talist” view that investors have of women EPZ workers (e.g., Ferna´ndez-
Kelly, 1983, p. 42).
In Mauritius, as in many other nations, promoting the EPZ was a mat-
ter near to the bureaucracy’s heart. The Development Bank of Mauritius
(DBM), which ran the EPZ, and the overseeing Ministry of Commerce and
Industry printed glossy brochures with rich illustrations and bullet-point
listings of all these incentives  including the nimble fingers, the high stan-
dard of modern Mauritian industrial buildings, and the pleasures of island
life  to be handed out to investors in the thousands (e.g., Ministry of
Commerce & Industry, 1973). The fact that the political and legal system in
Mauritius was stable and investor friendly and that the state put lots of
money into economic development was publicized globally, with large
advertisements in international newspapers drawing attention to each
amendment of the Mauritian EPZ Act and to each new fiscal measure that
put more money into the MEPZ (e.g., Ministry of Commerce & Industry
(Mauritius), 1973, 1976). In other words, the MEPZ was very much a state
affair. Supported by advisors from international creditors and donors such
as the World Bank and the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization, national bureaucracies took control of economic develop-
ment and in many ways circumscribed the position of the national
workforce.
The early years of MEPZ operations offer important insights into how
nation-states and international organizations regulated capitalist accumula-
tion in EPZs during the 1970s, when hundreds of today’s more than 3,000
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zones became operational. Such insights are needed, because the above-
mentioned juxtaposition of the zones as emblems of neoliberalism, either of
the exceptional or the unexceptional kind, offers nothing much but an
impasse. The problem with anthropology’s analysis of neoliberalism lies
with its timing, with the notion that it is a watershed in human history com-
ing as radical rupture (for these arguments see Baca, 2005, 2010; Neveling,
2006, forthcoming). What is brought forward in the critique of “neoliberal-
ism as exception” (Ong, 2006) is that in regard to EPZs it “ignores how
these spaces are structurally embedded in the wider economy” (Cross, 2010,
pp. 36970). The clash of arguments that might be intended here is one that
resembles other debates in anthropology, where one scholar prefers a
“worm’s eye view” (Cross, 2010, p. 358), to the extent that enquiry starts
with the workers digging the foundations of an EPZ, whereas another scho-
lar has an eye on global conjunctures and sees EPZs as emblems of the
“very strategy of graduated sovereignty that embeds society in global pro-
duction and financial markets” (Ong, 2006, p. 92). Both paradigms are
important for an anthropology interested in the patterns regulating capital-
ist accumulation. But neither offers insights into how regulation of such a
particular arena of capitalist accumulation emerges, how it is perceived by
the actors involved, and what anthropology should make of this in analyti-
cal terms so that findings exceed both the native’s point of view and the
metadescriptive level. New analytical insights may instead result from criti-
cal engagement with long-held categories in economic anthropology. The
notion of embeddedness, for example, is important to both Ong and Cross,
but employed to very different ends. Similarly, a critical evaluation of
“informality” in EPZs is what Cross puts forward to counter Ong. Again,
however, the scale of the analysis is problematic, because Ong is speaking
about a global condition, whereas Cross refers to the particularities of the
Indian setting.
This paper departs from the view of neoliberalism as structured contin-
gency and untimely coincidence to develop alternative understandings of
what formal and informal economic activities are and what embeddedness
is. Based on a historical anthropology of the early years of MEPZ opera-
tions, “Section One” shows that state regulation of capitalist exploitation
in EPZs amounts to the creation of informal economic activities in the eyes
of all actors involved (workers, politicians, capitalists, ordinary citizens).
Because this is so, I propose a revision of anthropology’s long-held under-
standing of the “informal economy” as the antithesis of “state capitalism”
(Hart, 2005, p. 6), which I base on Fernand Braudel’s classification of
capitalism as an “anti-market.” This anti-market is one of “three discrete,
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contemporaneous spheres of activity, ranging from self-provisionings of
everyday life, to the fulfillment of needs in markets, to capitalism, the locus
of monopolists and political predators interested in eliminating competition
in economic transactions” (Blim, 2000, p. 27). In other words, state-actors
and capitalists striving for sustainable accumulation are dependent on the
inequality that comes with the anti-market and offers protection from
actors playing by different rules.
I propose that we define the term embedded as having everyone play by
the same rules. This requires an anti-market that is regulated nationally
and internationally by laws, policed internally and externally accordingly,
with limitations to the right of entry and codes of conduct that are widely
accepted. This is an important amendment of anthropology’s common
notion of the workings of markets, which too often builds on the premise of
a historical shift from regulated markets to self-regulated markets. Such a
notion of radical rupture is particularly prominent in works that see the
most recent era as one of “neoliberalism” (see above). But it stems in many
ways from a distinction proposed by Polanyi between a “human economy”
that is “embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non-
economic” (Polanyi, 1957, p. 250) and a “market economy,” where a self-
regulating mechanism determines the production and distribution of goods
that are exchanged in price-fixing markets (Polanyi, 1977, p. 102, my trans-
lation). Because such a self-regulating market takes a predominant stage in
the organization of human life, the economy is said to be disembedded from
other institutions of human life: the pre-self-regulated-market organizational
principle is deemed “social”; the later principle is deemed “economic.”
Other authors have suggested that even in a longer historical view,
Polanyi was on the wrong track. Many features of self-regulating markets
can be found much earlier than the mid-19th century, while features of
regulated markets that Polanyi claims have vanished can actually be found
in the present (Braudel, 1992, pp. 225229). This is why it is misleading to
call “one form of exchange economic and another social” (Braudel, 1992,
p. 227). Economic sociologists and some social anthropologists nowadays
propose that we speak of all economies as embedded (Barber, 1995;
Rottenburg, Kalthoff, & Wagener, 2000).
“Section Two” applies this understanding with Polanyi’s second impor-
tant dictum in mind, which says that a “double movement” results from
the self-regulating market’s disembedding effect. Those who suffer turn to
the state for protection. Should they achieve significant institutional
change, “embedded liberalism” may emerge. Again, empirical accuracy is
an issue here, as Polanyi reserved the term double movement for estranged
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workers. But in the 20th century it was often capitalists who pressured the
state to protect their interests. What Polanyi saw as an end of history,
embedded liberalism, turns out to be an oscillating power struggle between
labor and capital (Blyth, 2003, pp. 34). To capture the dynamics of the
anti-market, “Section Two” goes beyond the winners and losers (capital
versus labor) perspective as it considers how changes in patterns of regulat-
ing accumulation lead to clashes among capitalists. The case I present was
hotly debated in Mauritius during my field research in 2003 and 2004. It
had to do with conflicting anti-market regulations on national and interna-
tional scales and emerged from the large-scale production and sale of coun-
terfeit Ralph Lauren garments.
In the concluding section, I analyze these clashes and their resolution as
moves from embeddedness, to disembeddedness, to reembeddedness. This
way, attention to double movements and embeddedness allows for middle-
range analyses that capture how patterns of regulation change over shorter
time spans. The section also shows what is gained if we use the differentia-
tion of formal and informal economic activities as a metadescriptive termi-
nology that captures emic/actors’ notions of one and the same economic
activity within a given state-capitalist setting. This feeds back usefully into
our process-oriented understanding of embeddedness as an analytical tool
for capturing divergences and realignments of patterns regulating capital-
ism in the global system.
SECTION ONE: THE MAURITIAN EXPORT
PROCESSING ZONE AS INFORMAL STATE
CAPITALISM
One ambition of this paper is to take the analysis of patterns regulating
capitalist accumulation further. For this it is instructive to enquire what the
development of the MEPZ can tell us about anthropology’s long-held con-
cerns with the informal economy and with the embeddedness of market
and society. The following addresses that issue and introduces the concept
of a statist informal economy.
Keith Hart coined the term informal economy and established this as an
“antithesis” to “state capitalism.” The latter emerged in the mid-19th cen-
tury as “an attempt to manage money and markets through national bure-
aucracy” (Hart, 2005, p. 6). Although the term state capitalism appeared
later in Hart’s work, the above juxtaposition was implicit in his
70 PATRICK NEVELING
groundbreaking 1973 article, which demonstrated that development eco-
nomics’ focus on employment in state-registered and regulated activities
failed to account for the many activities by which the urban poor get by in
the Ghanaian capital of Accra. There, the economic activities of peddlers,
hawkers, petty criminals, and so forth had a much lesser “degree of rationa-
lisation of work,” and hence, such activities awarded less predictable income
than stable state-registered employment (Hart, 1973, p. 68).1
Based on what has been said above about its establishment and interna-
tional promotion, the MEPZ should make for an excellent example of
Hart’s “state capitalism.” A law was passed in parliament to establish the
EPZ; the DBM and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry ran the zone
and were responsible for advertising it internationally. In the 1970s, the
MEPZ was a state-driven economic initiative with a high degree of rationa-
lization. Everything points to the MEPZ being a prototypical formal eco-
nomic activity. If we take a closer look at the establishment and early
operations of the MEPZ and its impact on everyday life on the island, a
very different picture emerges, however. The following breaks this down
for the metacategories capital, state, and labor and shows how informality
emerges from the native’s point of view rather than as an analytical cate-
gory, which can be used to maintain or counter notions of radical rupture,
such as neoliberalism.
The MEPZ as Informal Through the Eyes of the State
In 1961 Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, leader of the Mauritian Labour Party,
went to London to negotiate independence for the British colony. Future
prospects for the small island in the western Indian Ocean were anything
but good. Economists and sociologists ranked Mauritius as a perfect case
study for the (neo-)Malthusian trap: sugar cane was the country’s only
export commodity, since the end of the Second World War the popula-
tion had grown rapidly, unemployment was high and rising, and the crea-
tion of new jobs seemed utopian (see Greenaway & Milner, 1991, p. 326;
Neveling, 2012, p. 261). The Colonial Office in London considered violent
tensions between the different groups inhabiting the island to be a very
likely scenario. This was because descendants of French colonizers,
African slaves, and indentured laborers, mainly of Indian origin, were
said to have different economic interests and positions (Colonial Office,
1959).
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The initial response from the colonial administration was to appoint
two survey missions, one headed by a famous sociologist, Richard M.
Titmuss, and one headed by a famous economist, James E. Meade, to
suggest ways out of the crisis. The Titmuss mission designed a social
security net for Mauritius, and the Meade mission proposed ways to
diversify the economy from its heavy reliance on sugar, mainly by advis-
ing strong (colonial) state support for so-called pioneer industries that
would produce commodities which Mauritius otherwise had to purchase
on the world market and pay for in scarce foreign exchange. The success
of these efforts by the late British colonial state was limited, however.
Finding a way to achieve substantial economic development remained
paramount after independence in 1968. Survey missions were sent out to
evaluate development policies in Hong Kong, Ireland, Puerto Rico,
Singapore, and Taiwan and returned with recommendations to set up an
EPZ (Neveling, 2012, pp. 27382).
Given that for the mid-2000s the International Labor Organization and
the World Bank are counting around 3,500 EPZs and SEZs, it is nowadays
rather common for nation-states to offer substantial incentives to investors,
such as the tax and customs waivers I have mentioned above (cf. Boyenge,
2007). But in the late 1960s this was uncharted territory for most postcolo-
nial nations. Therefore, even in a country as desperate as Mauritius, parlia-
mentary readings of the EPZ Act during the legislature of 1970 were rather
heated. Disputes cut across party lines as much as across the ethnic and
religious groups that many anthropologists hold to be the fundamental pat-
terns of sociability among Mauritians (e.g., Eriksen, 1998).
Opponents claimed the EPZ would cause a breakdown of moral order
and attract few investors (Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1970,
pp. 12441256). Supporters saw immediate economic prosperity on the
horizon and argued that the EPZ would make Mauritius known world-
wide, attracting not only investors but also tourists (Debates of the
Legislative Assembly, 1970, pp. 939945). This was a strong argument, as
by the late 1960s, attracting tourism was another important development
strategy for Mauritius (for an outline of the historical development of tour-
ism in Mauritius, see Schnepel & Schnepel, 2008, pp. 611). The strongest
argument in favor of an EPZ was, however, that there already existed an
EPZ-like factory in Mauritius. As early as 1965 the owner of Micro Jewels,
a factory processing parts for Swiss watches, had obtained tax and customs
exemptions by private lobbying in London, supported by Meade, who had
led the economic survey mission to Mauritius in 1960 (personal conversa-
tion August 20, 2003; see also Burn, 1996).
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State capitalism in colonial times knew many such backchannels. Places
like 1960s Mauritius were an ideal breeding ground for informal networks
through which powerful players in business, the colonial state, education,
and religious congregations secured or improved their positions.2 A club
called Stella Clavisque (“the star and the key”), referring to Mauritius’ stra-
tegic importance in the Indian Ocean before the opening of the Suez Canal,
was of particular relevance to Mauritian early postcolonial history
(cf. Neveling, 2015b), and so was the Rotary Club Port Louis, founded in
1964, with the owner of Micro Jewels serving as second president. Other
members included the former director of the DBM and the later Minister
of Commerce and Industry of 1970, who during the above-mentioned read-
ings of the EPZ bill would present Micro Jewels as a shining example
for the benefits of an EPZ (cf. Debates of Legislative Assembly, 1970,
pp. 1181, 1256).
This surely helped to pass the EPZ Act. Besides considerable differences,
there had also been common ground among members of parliament. One
common theme was that the rights held by workers in other sectors would
not attract foreign investors. Redundancy payments were quickly dis-
missed. Concern over a minimum wage and unionization was brushed aside
with reference to the survey missions, which had underlined that EPZ fac-
tories would mainly hire women (Neveling, 2012, p. 277). Mauritius in this
regard was similar to Caribbean countries where a “myth of the male
breadwinner” (Safa, 1995) meant that women’s labor was devalued by
multinational corporations investing in EPZs as much as by local patriar-
chal structures (for details on gender and the MEPZ see Neveling, 2006,
2015b).
The fact that Mauritian MPs wittingly introduced what they considered
to be informal economic practices is further evidenced in earlier parliamen-
tary debates that considered whether tax and customs rebates for pioneer-
ing industries should be upheld by the postcolonial state. Even for these
import-substituting industries, there was suspicion that such waivers came
close to smuggling, as the following excerpt shows:
Mr. Ramallah: Government was very well advised to give such a rebate to the garment
factories and today we are producing very fine garments, specially shirts. Ten years
ago, people sneered at it when we said that we should manufacture garments, specially
shirts (…) today our garments are fetching a good market abroad. I know a few friends
who took with them some shirt from Mauritius, which they bought for Rs. 8 at a sale
and sold these shirts in India at Rs. 35.
Mr. A. R. Mohamed: And they were not confiscated by the customs? (This remark
causes general laughter). (Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1968, p. 2983)
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Preliminary Conclusions on Informal State Capitalism and
Market Regulation
In 1971 the government presented a 10-year development plan and pro-
mised the creation of 130,000 jobs within 10 years under the slogan
“Discipline, travail et participation” (L’Express, 1971). Although 10 years
later there were only about 20,000 jobs in EPZ factories, this was quite an
accomplishment. The British colonial administration had struggled to cre-
ate some 8,000 jobs in the highly subsidized pioneer industries of the 1960s,
when the situation in Mauritius and in the global system was comparatively
calm. The 1970s instead started off with the Mauritian government declar-
ing a state of emergency in 1971 that would last for five years, with a global
crisis in 1973, a national general strike in 1975, and another global crisis
and national general strike in 1979.
Still, investors kept coming. Although the 1980s started off with a
World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme and a landslide victory of
the socialist party, EPZ investment reached unseen peaks. This was not
because a self-regulated, neoliberal market had finally come about, but
because state diplomacy secured preferential export quota for sugar to the
European Economic Community under the Yaounde´ Agreement and suc-
ceeding Lome´ Agreements. Sugar prices rose during the world food crisis
of 1973, and local capitalists put these revenues into the EPZ, where their
capital was safe from nationalization and investment was tax free
(Neveling, 2012, pp. 32631). Another important regulation on the global
scale played into Mauritian cards as well. The Multi-Fiber Arrangement of
1974 set quota limits for imports to Europe and North America from so-
called Newly Industrializing Countries. In the early 1980s, Sri Lanka,
Hong Kong, and Singapore reached their quota ceilings. As investors dis-
covered the untapped Mauritian quota, a rush started, and official
figures claimed full employment for 1990, while economists spoke of an
“economic miracle” (cf. Aladin, 1993).
The story presented so far was prototypical for Third-World countries.
Even though many zones were failures, EPZs became an ever more obvious
step to successfully achieve economic diversification throughout the 1970s
and 1980s. Most EPZ projects were built on expectations of export earn-
ings, mass employment in industry, technology transfer, backward linkages
with local businesses, and other important factors that would increase what
was called “the formal sector” (cf. Neveling, forthcoming). But if we take a
closer look at how Mauritian politicians perceived the EPZ, the story gets a
twist. The praise for taking shirts to India and selling them there during a
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private journey and the laughter that followed during the bill readings of
1968 indicate that MPs imagined the EPZ as an informal economic practice.
In many ways, the findings from Mauritius echo observations for Latin
American countries “where the state has consistently adopted antilabor
and deregulatory policies and the […] distinction between formal and infor-
mal sectors becomes blurred” (Portes & Benton, 1984, p. 605). In
Mauritius, blurring that distinction stood at the cradle of the EPZ. It is
therefore worthwhile to broaden the picture and to question whether the
factories that set up shop in MEPZ qualify as actors in a “formal econ-
omy”  and whether the EPZ regime qualifies as a globally salient phe-
nomenon of state capitalism. The following shows that the viewpoints of
capital and labor on the MEPZ were quite similar to those of politicians.
The MEPZ as Informal in the Eyes of Labor
Factory workers in Plaine Lauzun and Coromandel, the first state-run
industrial estates, came from the poor areas that surround the capital, Port
Louis, and the larger cities to the south. These had emerged from an earlier
modernization project. In 1960, the colonial state had rehoused tens of
thousands of poor Mauritians, whose dwellings had been destroyed by two
cyclones. Ten years later, government land purchases for the construction
of industrial estates were planned with the explicit aim to target the inhabi-
tants of these cite´s (Development Bank of Mauritius/Gustave Rey,
undated, around 1971). As more and more cite´-dwellers took employment
in EPZ factories, the settlements became known as cite´s ouvrie`res, “work-
ers’ housing estates.”
These new workers soon renamed the “zone franche” into “zone souf-
france,” and for good reason. By shifting from the French phrase for “free
zone” to “zone of suffering,” workers referred to the fact that the state law
denied them basic rights, such as unionization and minimum wages, which
existed for workers in the sugar sector and for government employees.
Relations on the shop floor were anything but dignified. Stories about
degrading recruitment policies of the 1970s are abundant in Mauritius until
today. If younger job seekers could not produce birth certificates or other
proof of identity, managers conducted what they called “tit-tests,” claiming
this was the only way to verify whether the applicant was above the mini-
mum working age of 14. Once workers were employed in an EPZ factory,
sexual harassment continued, and there were numerous wildcat strikes
because of physical violence by supervisors (Neveling, 2006).
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The perception of the EPZ by Mauritian workers mirrors observations
from Latin America, namely that “[f]rom the perspective of people living on
subsistence production or working in the informal sector it is rather the offi-
cial and formal economy of large organizations and government bureaucra-
cies which is a ‘shadow economy’” (Evers, 1987, p. 364, my translation). In
other words, the same stratum of poor urban dwellers that Hart encountered
in Accra, and whose economic activities led him to juxtapose the terms infor-
mal economy and state capitalism, serves to illustrate the opposite, that state
capitalism may well be perceived as the informal economy in Mauritius.
Recently, anthropologists have suggested highlighting continuities with
informal economic relations of earlier days to fully capture working condi-
tions in EPZs (Cross, 2010). The Mauritian example rather serves to high-
light discontinuities. Workers in long-established economic sectors, such as
technicians in the sugar mills or dock workers, had won the right to unioni-
zation and strike action in the late 1930s and early 1940s (Neveling, 2012,
pp. 211232). Employment relations in the very same sectors may have
been different for day laborers and seasonal workers. But this had had to
do with a lack of regulation from the colonial state and amendments that
had been made in the 1960s. In the MEPZ instead, it was state regulation
that encouraged and actually initiated new informal economic relations
that in many ways reversed the achievements of labor during colonial
times. Spirit possession that led to production stops in EPZ factories were
one way such concerns were voiced; wildcat strikes were another; whereas
complaints to the ministries had no resonance with a state that was quick
to deploy riot police to beat up pickets (Neveling, 2015b).
These are vivid illustrations of the way the Mauritian state secured the
operations of the EPZ anti-market. Labor was supposed to be cheap and
docile from the viewpoint of investors, and anything else was unacceptable.
In many ways, then, the “native’s point of view” of politicians and workers
on the Mauritian EPZ, if not taken “as an end in itself” (Carrier, 2012,
p. 121) but as a means to produce further-reaching theoretical insights,
confronts the anthropologist’s point of view (i.e., that of Cross and Hart).
Looking at the perceptions of capitalists operating in the MEPZ can
further substantiate this assertion.
The MEPZ as Informal in the Eyes of Capital
A 1983 report by a leading analyst of the island’s oldest bank, the
Mauritius Commercial Bank, complained about “unverifiable” EPZ
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companies “rip[ping] off” the state as they used semi-legal employment to
evade the few taxes payable (Forget, 1983, pp. 78). Other natives of the
global capitalist system, foreign investors, instead wondered why long-
practiced and elaborate management strategies used in industrially
advanced countries could not increase Mauritian worker productivity. A
garment manufacturer who came to the island in 1971 only got operations
running at a profit, his daughter claimed (speaking to me in 2004), after
German managers had been replaced with a retired British colonial army
officer who introduced “childish incentives” for good performances, such
as gifts of plastic bowls and other cheap household utensils. Other com-
pany managers I spoke to remembered how in the 1970s and 1980s many
foreign investors felt cheated by local Mauritian banks. Their suspicion
was that the Mauritius Commercial Bank, for example, was used by local
businessmen to monitor which foreign-owned companies could reap the
highest profits. If such a company had been identified, it would be drained
of credit in those months when orders from Western markets came in and
raw materials had to be bought. Once the end of the global garment mar-
ket’s low season had come and the company had been fully drained, it
would be placed in receivership and auctioned off to one of the bank man-
ager’s many cousins. The harshest and most entertaining such story told of
an Englishman who lost all his investment due to this modern form of pri-
vateering, something that left him so annoyed that he crashed his car into a
pylon close to the airport and walked the last kilometer  just to leave
nothing of value behind.
Economic anthropologists often identify those activities as informal,
which are either ignored by or hidden from the state (cf. Cross, 2010; Hart,
1973). In Mauritius, however, the state consciously set up the EPZ with
features that anthropologists take to be informal. This is even more striking
because the EPZ was meant to become the backbone of national economic
progress. As EPZ operations developed and became more refined, all actors
involved realized that this was an arena of insecure and highly dubious eco-
nomic transactions. Such state-sponsored transactions then indicate that
anthropology’s view of state capitalism is problematic and leads to misun-
derstandings, because capitalism is presented as a rationalized system of
the Weberian type. As the above discussion has shown, capitalism is better
understood as an anti-market that is actively upheld by the state.
I have now shown that the distinction of formal versus informal is best
used to capture the emic perspective of actors involved in establishing a
new pattern regulating capitalist exploitation, such as the MEPZ. For an
analysis of such patterns, the formal-informal dichotomy is less useful.
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Therefore, I turn to another crucial aspect of anthropology’s understand-
ing of capitalism, Polanyi’s distinction of “embedded” economies and “dis-
embedded” economies. The following will show that once we trade
Polanyi’s evolutionist approach for a process-oriented understanding of
embedding, disembedding, and reembedding the anti-market within a given
economic arena, we can use this as a middle-range analysis of the contests
between capitalist actors and/or institutions over defining the rules for
transactions. These three shades of embeddedness then help to capture
how highly regulated state-capitalist ventures such as the MEPZ produce a
variety of double movements, because the outcomes of such ventures are
“partially intended and partially unintended” (Rottenburg et al., 2000,
p. 24).
SECTION TWO: RALPH LAUREN MAURITIAN
STYLE; AND THE THREE SHADES OF
EMBEDDEDNESS IN GLOBAL CAPITALISM
Mauritius is rather an upmarket holiday destination, partly because the
national tourism promotion agency has successfully created an image of
Mauritius as somewhat equivalent with Tahiti, the Seychelles, or the
Maldives. Hotel complexes ranging in ratings from three to five stars take
up most of the good spots along the island’s shore (cf. Schnepel, 2009).
Similar to the EPZ, the percentage of local ownership is high in the hotel
industry. This is facilitated by the fact that land ownership in the sugar
industry was mainly local. Chains such as the Constance Hotels and
Resorts Group and EPZ factories such as Ferney Spinning Mills still bear
the names of sugar estates and are owned by consortia that emerged during
the 1870s, 1930s, and 1970s, which were periods of centralization in the
sugar sectors.3 Five-star hotels attract the full range of late modern capital-
ism’s celebrities: the “A-class,” such as David Beckham or Madonna, and
the “C-class,” such as the odd TV-show contest winner whose claim to
fame has been prolonged by informal engagement with one or several “A-
class” members. The bulk of arrivals, however, are German, French,
English, and Dutch tourists of middle-class income, mindset, and tastes,
who find accommodation in the less fancy resorts and hotels.4
Such tourists may be attracted by images of white beaches, snorkeling
the coral reefs, palm trees, and exotic food. But the local tourism industry
eagerly adds culture to the tourist experience, for example by providing
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evening dance shows by the beach or in hotel restaurants that introduce
tourists to the Mauritian Se´ga music (Schnepel & Schnepel, 2009). While
Se´ga is portrayed as a domain of the descendants of African slaves brought
to the island to work in the French and early British period, encounters
with descendants of other immigrant groups such as the Chinese coolies
and merchants, the Gujarati traders, or the Indian indentured laborers, are
offered as excursions visiting local markets and the small Chinatown in the
capital. More intimate encounters include coming to the household of a
local tour guide as the final stage of day trips to see “the real life” of
Mauritians. The island’s changing incorporation into the global capitalist
system and the labor regimes that came along with this are displayed as
lightly consumable versions and focus largely on events prior to indepen-
dence. A museum on the history of the sugar industry, for example, is
housed in a former sugar mill owned by one of the largest Mauritian con-
sortia and called “L’aventure du Sucre.” In sum, Mauritius is displayed as
a tropical paradise that is exceptional in that many different ethnic groups
live side-by-side in peace. Never accounted for are the persistence of grave
inequalities, the general strikes and the rise of a socialist movement in the
1970s, or the World Bank and International Monetary Fund policies that
ended this rise in the early 1980s.
Coming to this setting with connections to be made and the small
research budget of a Ph.D. student for preliminary research in 2003 was a
challenge. Although I arrived in July, in the Mauritian winter when tem-
peratures are in the lower 20s of the Celsius scale and tourist arrivals are
few, it was difficult to find affordable accommodation not mainly catering
for locals entertaining extramarital relations for a night or for foreign petty
traders looking for a dodgy deal. After some days of searching, I settled for
spending the first two weeks in a family-run hotel in a small village right on
the road connecting the southern region with the capital, Port Louis.
There, in Tamarin, Mauritius’ “traditional” economic activities still had a
strong presence. Sugar cane fields dominated the slopes rising to one of the
island’s plateaus to the east. Close to the beach looking westward to
Tamarin Bay, there was a small cold store where fishermen kept their catch
until the local cooperative’s truck came for collection. At first sight, the
only peculiarity was the island’s largest desalination plant, located not far
from the village, a basin lined with old brickwork carved of the volcanic
stones that had been collected in painful labor by slaves and coolies to free
the ground for cane fields. The lands next to the beach were lined with
small bungalows owned by white middle-class families (on such property
relations see Salverda & Hay, 2013). Such bungalows are sometimes rented
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out to tourists or relatives visiting from Europe, Eastern Africa, and the
neighboring island, Reunion. On the edges of the village there was the odd
church built by one of the families who owned the local sugar estate some
time in the 18th or 19th century, and next to this were larger hotels, hous-
ing 50 or so rooms and individual restaurants.
There would have been nothing unusual to the place had it not been for
the surprisingly large fashion shop that looked like a factory outlet store,
flew the US flag, and offered only garments with the Ralph Lauren brand
name. Actually, the road connecting the UNESCO world heritage site, Le
Morne Mountain, in the south with the capital was lined with such shops.
However small the roadside settlement, it housed such a shop. Ralph
Lauren polo shirts, trousers, and men’s shirts were in abundant supply, and
although I was not aware of the prices asked in Europe for such clothes,
they seemed rather cheap. Only during my longer research in 2004 would I
learn that back in 2003 there had been 430 Ralph Lauren shops in
Mauritius  one shop for every 2,790 inhabitants  a ratio some Third-
World regions would be happy to see for the number of doctors per
inhabitant.
Another incident that took me by surprise and would consolidate my
interest in the phenomenon happened after I visited the Royal Botanical
Gardens in Pamplemousses. In these gardens, the French physiocrat
Pierre Poivre experimented with coffee and cane seeds stolen from British
and Dutch colonial possessions in the 18th century. For these and other
reasons, the gardens feature prominently in historical writings on
Mauritius (Grove, 1995; Storey, 1997). I missed the bus and was happy
when a taxi driver offered a ride to the next seaside resort, Grand Baie,
at an incredibly low rate. Approaching Grand Baie, I learned how the
price had come about. The driver suggested we should stop at a shop sell-
ing Ralph Lauren garments. I would not have to buy anything. I just had
to enter, and he would earn a commission that would compensate him
twofold for the reduced fare on which I had travelled. Tiredly appealing
to some equivalent of a moral economy I mistakenly believed to be rele-
vant in Mauritius, I refused to set foot in a shop selling ugly polo shirts
for the petty bourgeoisie and missed out on a possibly insightful, impor-
tant research experience, which I could not repeat once I returned in
2004.
This was because by then the issue of Ralph Lauren sales in Mauritius
had exploded, not only on the national level, but on the level of the interna-
tional garment industry. A couple of weeks before I left for my second
research trip to Mauritius in February 2004, one of the most important
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knowledge platforms for the global textile and garment sector featured the
following story as headline in its daily newsletters:
A Mauritius court has banned businesses on the island from manufacturing goods bear-
ing the logo of fashion designer Polo Ralph Lauren Corp.
The United States-based company, which has objected to the practice for more than a
decade, was granted a temporary injunction against Mauritian businesses making and
selling unlicensed Polo apparel earlier this year.
“On Wednesday (the court) granted the company a permanent injunction,” a court offi-
cial said. “Local outlets are now not allowed to produce or sell goods with the Ralph
Lauren name or logo.”
While local retailers claim about 7,000 jobs are at risk as a result of the ruling, judge
Paul Lam Shang Lee said the court had the Mauritian economy’s best interests at
heart.
“If thousands of people will be affected, the fault lies with those purveyors of others’
ideas and works who have created the situation and who have been enjoying a very
lucrative market,” he said.
“The state has at heart the future of the economy of the country and most of all the
desire to show the whole world that Mauritius is not anymore a safe haven for counter-
feiters.” (Just-Style.Com, 2004)
This charts well what was at stake in February 2004 for Mauritius. The
continued sale of Ralph Lauren counterfeit garments had triggered an inter-
national dispute. Now that this dispute had been won by the American
brand, the future of several hundred shops, that of thousands of Mauritian
workers producing the garments, and even the reputation of the island as a
national economy supporting the proper conduct of business were in jeo-
pardy. This was particularly contentious because EPZ investors were pack-
ing up and relocating to the People’s Republic of China and India in search
of cheaper labor in recent years. After the establishment of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), Mauritius had lost preferential quotas and with them
many jobs (Neveling, 2006). The following traces the emergence of this sur-
prisingly large and for many years legal business of counterfeit garment pro-
duction and sales on Mauritius and relates this to the processes of
embedding, disembedding, and reembedding markets in global capitalism.
Embedding, Disembedding, and Reembedding Informal State Capitalism
As illustrated in the preceding section, the EPZ regime established by the
Mauritian state ticked the boxes that anthropologists often reserve for the
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informal economy. To generalize (and possibly exaggerate) the various
viewpoints that I have outlined above: Members of parliament associated
the EPZ with smuggling, a large local bank suggested that EPZ investors
were ripping off the state, and at least one investor felt ripped off by the
very same local bank to an extent that led him to crash his car before
departing for good. As I have shown, such sentiments featured prominently
in debates during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, before the advent of
large-scale investment in the MEPZ turned the island’s economy around
miraculously. And even nowadays, such stories are told again and again,
making for telling legends of the early days of the MEPZ. The fact that
they continue to be told is one of many indications that shady practices did
not cease to exist when the boom came. I heard again and again of inci-
dents of companies closing and taking with them all machinery overnight,
so that workers arriving for the morning shift found nothing but an empty
state-owned building. Also, at one point in 1990, the official stamp used to
identify exports of those particular garments entering the European Union
under the favorable quota regime was lost, and newspapers reported for
several days on the search for it (L’Express, 1990).
Despite all this, or rather because of the state-backed anti-market that
was the MEPZ, numerous Western fashion companies set up production
sites in the MEPZ. Others subcontracted with an increasing number of
local businesses offering such services to produce garments based on their
specifications for designs and materials. One of these was Ralph Lauren.
The stories I heard from local experts in the garment sector said that Ralph
Lauren had had a factory in Mauritius; researchers have reported that the
company used the subcontracting model (Edensor & Kothari, 2006,
p. 330). Irrespective of the business model used, Ralph Lauren moved on
from Mauritius in 1990, only to wake up to a bad surprise: production in
Mauritius continued. How could this happen?
Technology transfer is one of the main aims that governments pursue
when setting up an EPZ. Over the years, Mauritians learned how to distin-
guish cheap and expensive brands, how to cut and design garments, and
how to run factories, and they also learned about the profit margins for
popular brand names. In addition, the sale of garments that might qualify
as counterfeit is not necessarily illegal. During an internship on the shop
floors of one Mauritian factory in 2004, I learned that for each order a sig-
nificant surplus is produced. This depends on the overall quality levels that
international brands require, which means that the quality testing in the
factory and from the buyer will result in products being rejected. It is not
uncommon that for an order of 10,000 men’s shirts, 11,500 shirts are
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actually produced. For reasons that have to do with the production pro-
cess, which is of lesser relevance here, collars and sleeves might not match,
pockets might have the wrong seams, garments might become soiled, and
so forth. In the factory, these “rejects” were grouped into three categories.
The presentable or easily repairable ones went to the factory’s tourist outlet
next to a local museum that tells the long story of garment design (but
nothing much about MEPZ in 2004). They were rebranded with the
Mauritian company’s name and sold at considerable margins. Second-
category rejects were sold in the shop next door to people from the neigh-
borhood, to workers, or to petty traders who would rebrand them, do
additional repairs, and sell them in local markets that were frequently vis-
ited by tourists and locals. Third-category rejects would be sold by the kilo-
gram to local tailors, who would use them for various purposes, often for
creating modern-style designs and passing them on to the same merchants
who bought category-two rejects. It was not possible to date the emergence
of this practice, but it had evidently gone on for several years. It should be
safe to assume that in this way Mauritians learned about the benefits of
selling world-market factory products to tourists and thereby shortcutting
global commodity chains.
In 1992 Aurdally Brothers Ltd. registered Ralph Lauren Polo as a trade-
mark in Mauritius. The brand had never been registered in Mauritius, the
Customs Controller in charge of the procedures had never heard of it, and
so production and sale of Ralph Lauren garments began with legal
approval. In 1994 and 1996, Ralph Lauren lawyers argued in court that the
seven-year registration given to Aurdally Brothers in accordance with the
Mauritian Companies Act of 1868 was illegal. They referred to the Paris
Convention of 1976, which prohibited the registration of an internationally
known trademark. Mauritian courts turned down appeals with reference to
the Customs Controller’s ignorance-based decision. Until 1997, Aurdally
Brothers produced shirts, t-shirts, and trousers with similar tissues, cuts,
and colors as Ralph Lauren’s Polo collection and branded them accord-
ingly (Ait-Hatrit, 2004).
Judging from my observations and discussions in Mauritius, the issue
can be broken down as follows. Although Ralph Lauren garments are quite
expensive, the collection consists largely of what might be called “no-fashion”
garments, meaning garments with simple styles, average quality fabrics,
and standard colors. A small polo-player logo, easily embroidered onto the
garments, gives an aristocratic odeur. High sales prices are backed by
expensive global advertisement campaigns. Target customers are suburban
middle- and upper middle-class people around the world with an average
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taste of style and a strong urge to look right-wing mainstream. Many of
the tourists attracted by the destination Mauritius have exactly this back-
ground. This makes for an excellent customer base with brand awareness.
Arrivals of tourists have risen constantly since 1970, and in 2003 the island
was counting 700,000, aiming to break the barrier of one million visitors
per year (Central Statistics Office, 2004).
So it was no wonder that Aurdally Brothers’ revenues from the
company-owned Marson stores were impressive. In 1997 the rights to the
trademark Ralph Lauren for Mauritius were sold for further commerciali-
zation to Captain Tasman for a considerable sum. The latter franchised
the brand to 50 shops at a price of 50,000 Mauritian Rupees (MUR) per
shop per month (Le Mauricien, 2004). This was a considerable amount
for Mauritian standards, and it is evidence that there was a lot of money
in the Ralph Lauren business. In 2000, the trademark registration had to
be renewed. Mauritian government authorities rejected this, and a local
court turned down a joint appeal of Aurdally Brothers and Captain
Tasman. The country had become a member of the WTO in 1995 and was
now subject to new international property rights agreements. Ralph
Lauren’s head office in New York also turned down an offer by Ajay
Beegoo, owner of Captain Tasman, to franchise the trademark. Beegoo
appealed, and the case got stuck in the Mauritian Supreme Court, mean-
ing that now no one held trademark rights for Ralph Lauren in Mauritius
(Pillay, 2004).
For some time, Ralph Lauren’s US owners thought that unfortunate
chapter was closed, only to wake up to a situation that was worse than in
the early 1990s. Shops selling and small factories producing clothes under
the label Ralph Lauren Polo had mushroomed all over the country. As I
said above, there were more than 400 boutiques selling the Polo brand in
Mauritius during my first field research in 2003. Small fishing villages
along the coast, with no other shopping facilities than a food store and a
snack bar maybe, housed at least one Ralph Lauren outlet. Arsenal, once
an insignificant settlement on the main road between the tourist resorts in
the north and Port Louis, had become the center of the business, with
four huge outlet stores, vast car parks, special sales promotion events,
and an elaborated system for attracting customers. Taxi owners, bus dri-
vers, and guides of Mauritian tour operators  anyone who could get a
tourist through the door  received anything from 100 to 500 MUR
each. This was independent of sales revenues. As I learned further in my
talks with taxi drivers and tour guides, they were given an additional 20
percent commission on all purchases. A tourist guide living in the same
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housing estate as I assured me that every single tour she had done
between 2000 and 2004 had stopped in Arsenal before taking the tourists
back to their hotels. Fees and commissions had made up more than 50
percent of her income.
From 2002 onward, Ralph Lauren increased pressure on the Supreme
Court. The tide turned when the company won the support of the US gov-
ernment. Mauritius enjoyed favorable export quota to the United States
under the African Growth and Opportunities Act since 1999, and threats
to take these quota away were persuasive. The Supreme Court ruled in
favor of Ralph Lauren on the 30th of January, 2004. The next day, the
Association of Mauritian Textile Producers and Retailers (this is one of
many such associations  despite the presumably all-encompassing name)
representing the local producers and vendors of Ralph Lauren garments
claimed that 10,000 jobs would be lost if operations were closed. The day
after the court decision, thousands of employees of now-illegal factories
and shops demonstrated (Le Mauricien, 2004). Reuters quoted the Captain
Tasman owner:
This is a typical example of powerful multinational companies coming in with expensive
lawyers and lots of money to disrupt the lives of people in poorer countries. How can
we fight a huge American company? […] so we are asking Ralph Lauren to give us 18
months to help us restructure and retrain our staff. But they have no humanitarian
face. (Bhalla, 2004)
Such rhetoric was well received by the Mauritian public. Since the foun-
dation of the WTO in 1995, the EPZ had gone through a series of crises.
The textile and garment sector made up the lion’s share of companies, and
with the intended phasing out of quota regimes on a global scale,
Mauritius was constantly threatened with the loss of one of its major
advantages over countries such as the People’s Republic of China, India, or
Bangladesh, where labor was cheaper. Particularly since the early 2000s,
tens of thousands of workers had lost their jobs because of relocations, and
critique of EPZ investors had intensified. One other striking development
had been that Mauritian companies had never managed to gain ground in
Western markets with their own fashion labels. Even the largest Mauritian
company, Floreal Knitwear, for a long time the world’s second largest pro-
ducer of knitted woolens, had seen its own brand, Harris Wilson, incur
massive losses in Europe (Neveling, 2006). In this climate it was no wonder
that many Mauritians actually regarded Ralph Lauren as the most success-
ful Mauritian fashion label. The affair was on the verge of turning into
“Ralph Lauren against Mauritius.”
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The US company had for some time fueled such sentiments. Despite
the favorable Supreme Court verdict in late January 2004, Ralph Lauren
had initially taken every measure to make sure Mauritians would stop sell-
ing counterfeit garments, for good and instantly so. Therefore, Ralph
Lauren had sent its own law enforcer to the island. This move was inter-
preted as a sign of distrust of the Mauritian police, which had set up a
special unit solely to support the US company. Still, Ralph Lauren’s
envoy, Marcel Lapierre, went from shop to shop, threatened owners with
high fines and offered individual phase-out agreements  a three-month
right to sell the rest of their stock in exchange for 5,000 MUR. Mauritian
newspapers portrayed Lapierre as a colonial-style cowboy, and the fact
that he wore a cowboy hat while carrying out his duties played into their
hands.
The heat was taken out of the issue when this policy was revoked. Ralph
Lauren sold licenses for the sale of existing stocks until the end of 2004 to
any existing shop willing to pay one million MUR. For the large shops in
Arsenal and elsewhere, this was a bargain, considering that across the
island there had been a monthly turnover of 200 million MUR. As the
news spread, tourists rushed to the shops as if they were the new Klondike,
happy to buy t-shirts for 800 MUR that would cost the equivalent of 3,000
MUR in Western countries (Bhuckory, 2004).
After the Mauritian companies producing and selling Ralph Lauren
had obtained some air to breathe by paying one million MUR compensa-
tion each in order to restructure and regroup, Captain Tasman set up a
fashion brand called “Liberty”  again advertising the garments with the
US flag on shop fronts, but to my knowledge without ever coming even
close to the sales figures of Ralph Lauren Mauritian style. At the time of
my most recent research in Mauritius in November 2012, all Liberty
shops had gone out of business. There were, however, a few brand-
named Ralph Lauren shops, located in the main tourist spots, at the
Caudan Waterfront in Port Louis, in the upmarket shopping district of
Grande Baie, and in the duty-free areas of the international airport’s arri-
val and departure terminals. These were run by locals who franchised
from Ralph Lauren and imported garments from overseas. As I was told,
prices were the same as those in Europe or Asia, and the purpose of the
shops was not necessarily to make high turnovers but to make sure that
“real” Ralph Lauren garments were visible on the Mauritian market, so
that no one would ever again get the idea that the label was there for the
taking.
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CONCLUSIONS: THE THREE SHADES OF
EMBEDDEDNESS AND THE MAINTENANCE
OF INFORMAL STATE CAPITALISM IN THE
GLOBAL EPZ REGIME
The above shows that smooth running of capitalist anti-markets is not
dependent only on state capitalism and its capacity to forge successful alli-
ances with international capital, as happened in the 1970s and particularly
so in the boom years of the MEPZ between 1985 and 1995. The initial
phase of MEPZ operations was shaped by mutual allegations of informal
dealings from all actors involved: the state, capital, and labor. The boom
years to some degree eased over such allegations. In many ways, the MEPZ
was embedded as an anti-market within Mauritian society in those years.
Workers who had stayed with a single company for many years achieved a
considerable degree of prosperity, and class struggle took a position at the
backstage of Mauritian politics. In those years an expression emerged that
equated the MEPZ with the mother’s household. “La cas maman” is a cen-
tral institution in Mauritian society, where one can see men in their mid-
50s going over to their mother’s house each Sunday and where Mother’s
Day is one of the most important shopping events of the year. But already
within that period of embeddedness, the seeds were sown for a disembed-
ding of the anti-market that kicked in as soon as MEPZ operations
declined. The wider framework for this was, of course, the foundation of
the WTO, which brought significant changes in the global trading system
that were disadvantageous for Mauritius.
But there is more to capitalist anti-markets than the analysis of the WTO
regulations and their local repercussions in national economies, factories,
and households will tell us. The example of counterfeit Ralph Lauren gar-
ments and their large-scale production in Mauritius powerfully illustrates
that local producers can successfully achieve at least some of the trickle-
down effects that national governments hope to gain from EPZ operations.
Technology transfer in Mauritius was mainly possible, however, because
national trademark legislation had not yet been adjusted to the island’s
embeddedness into the global commodity chain for textiles and garments.
In a sense, international agreements preventing the production of counter-
feit clothes signed in the mid-1990s were “late-comers” from the viewpoint
of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement of 1974, which had made it possible for
Mauritius to gain access to the global garment chain in the first place.5
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Western fashion chains such as Ralph Lauren never saw Mauritius as a
market for selling their products. In the early 1990s, after two decades of
garment production, Mauritian businesspeople had sufficient knowledge to
replicate Ralph Lauren designs. More importantly though, they realized
that they were ideally positioned to cut out important nodes of the global
garment commodity chain. They could sell their products directly to custo-
mers from Western markets  to those who came to Mauritius as tourists.
Thus, Aurdally Brothers and Captain Tasman had made ends meet; the
ends of two commodity chains  of the tourism industry and of the gar-
ment industry. The WTO, which initially distorted the embeddedness of the
MEPZ as its policies since 1995 caused rising unemployment and discon-
tent, would in the 2000s serve as an important, albeit unintended, mediator
for a reembedding of the MEPZ, at least in terms of the Ralph Lauren
case. Intellectual property rights agreements signed by Mauritius as a WTO
member closed the gap that I have identified above. The decline of the
MEPZ increased dependency on the quota that were left from such prefer-
ential agreements as the US African Growth and Opportunities Act, and
this caused sufficient fear for the Mauritian Supreme Court to reverse its
earlier decisions and stop dragging out the Ralph Lauren case.
From this angle, embeddedness  not as a Polanyian end to a
precapitalist multi-faceted social order, but as a process-oriented analysis
of the impact that the patterns of regulating capitalist exploitation have on
a given place such as Mauritius  is useful to identify the contests that
emerge as new actors enter the capitalist anti-market and old actors exit.
Obviously, embeddedness, then, also retains its ability to identify the degree
of discontent that exploitation nurtures in societies as they move from
economic decline to growth, to decline and so on.
My analysis of Mauritian EPZ operations over four decades reveals
that a juxtaposition of informal economic activities and state capitalism
provides little gain but is rather misleading. This has to do with the fact
that the patterns employed for regulating capitalism are neither rational
nor do they have much to do with “the market.” One might object that the
highly exploitative regime of EPZs provides a case that plays into the cards
of such a dismissal. But then the success of an EPZ did not and does not
rest on exploitation alone. Other factors, such as preferential quotas for
the markets of wealthy nations, play a much more important role, not
least in the present, when there are around 3,500 EPZs with more than 60
million workers in approximately 130 countries (Neveling, 2015a).
While the informal-formal distinction, then, is rather misleading and
best used to capture the native’s point of view, maintaining the concept of
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embeddedness by transferring it to the analysis of capitalist anti-markets is
beneficial. The relations among state, capital, and labor are constantly
shifting in global manufacturing, as much in the past as in the present era,
which is often mistakenly identified as radically different from earlier peri-
ods because it is “neoliberal” (Baca, 2005, 2010; Neveling, 2006; Neveling,
forthcoming). In any given place there will be periods when such relations
are rather stable (again, not because they show a high degree of rationaliza-
tion and can therefore be labeled “formal”). Instead, the “logic of the mar-
ket” that the case of the MEPZ and the counterfeit production of Ralph
Lauren garments reveals matches the observation that “[M]arkets are by
necessity legal-politically and socio-culturally embedded [… or disem-
bedded by] a framework within which only that which is calculable and
economically efficient is valid.” What others have poignantly identified as
the way the “logic of the market […] can emerge” (Rottenburg et al., 2000,
p. 24, my addition/omission) may be called a “logic of the anti-market.”
This inhibits a rationality that is shared by and reserved for a given number
of actors at a given moment in space and time. But there are always others
who contest that very logic, hoping either to be invited to the ranks of
those who benefit from the regulations of the capitalist anti-market or hop-
ing to change the patterns of regulation once and for all so that a different
logic may emerge that does not put exploitation and accumulation at the
center of economic activity.
NOTES
1. In sum, Hart takes a fundamentally Weberian view on the economy, arguing,
for example, that “society everywhere is held together by force” in his later work
(Hart, 2005, p. 4).
2. Until today, such networks produce much more meaningful “cross-cutting
ties” than those identified by anthropologists (e.g., Eriksen, 1998, pp. 10336), who
look at Mauritius through the “ethnic lens,” to borrow a term that Glick-Schiller
and others have coined as a critique of migration studies (Glick-Schiller, C¸aglar, &
Guldbrandsen, 2006).
3. This history is rather common knowledge in Mauritius as well as in the inter-
national development community concerned with the island. The literature on these
developments is abundant, and it would be hard to find any Mauritian who does
not know about the diversification from sugar to textiles/garments and tourism (for
an overview of several histories of Mauritian consortia and their venture from sugar
into textiles/garments see: Gre´goire & Lemoine, 2011). My own work covers the his-
torical development since around 1800 of what is today the CIEL Holding, which
has three main branches and hundreds of sister companies in agriculture, textiles/
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garments, IT and tourism, and real estate (cf. Neveling, 2012). Salverda (2010,
pp. 110154) also devotes a full chapter to “Land, Textiles and Tourists,” although
this has names anonymized. There is also a standard work of reference on the
Mauritian sugar industry since its beginning, and the interested reader will find that
there are many more hotels that bear the names of former estates (Rouillard,
19641979).
4. This is both a reflection of tourist arrival numbers during the time of my
research (see Central Statistics Office, 2004) and of my observations and interac-
tions during field research. It is noteworthy that the global backpackers’ bible,
Lonely Planet lists hardly any low budget accommodations for Mauritius (cf.
Bindloss, Singh, Swaney, & Strauss, 2001).
5. This is one of many examples why the quest for a critical political economy
in anthropology is not to fight the windmills of rational choice theory and
neo-/classical economics. Rational choice in the sense that neoclassical economists
would want to have it does not exist and has never existed. Therefore, it is futile to
trace when the relationship between economy and society went sour. Any such
effort would imply that this relationship has not been sour all along and would this
way neglect the fact that inequality is a persistent feature of human history.
Institutions, such as markets and anti-markets, are “derivative and adaptive and
not the cause or  contra Polanyi  the social embedment of the economic process”
(Frank, 1998, p. 206). Change and continuity in the global system and within global
capitalism are dependent on more complex processes than an institutional view can
provide. What the institutional view can provide though, is a middle-range analysis
of the way institutions are adapted to the wider patterns regulating capitalist exploi-
tation. Anything beyond that will be discussed in future publications.
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